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Abstract
Empirical investigations of analysts’ forecast surveys concerning earn-
ings realizations find significant time varying biases usually attributed to
the analysts’ liability to cognitive limitations. For example, a positive
autocorrelation of analysts’ forecast errors is commonly explained by ana-
lysts’ underreaction. In this paper we develop a random dynamical system
describing the evolution of analysts’ forecasts and firm’s prices and show
that managerial guidance is capable to explain such inefficiencies in the
analysts’ forecasting behavior. This result is well supported by empiri-
cal tests. In particular, we find that the managers of growth firms guide
stronger than the managers of value firms, which allows further conclu-
sions on the precision and efficiency of earnings forecasts released for value
and growth stocks in line with the literature.
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1 Introduction
The question whether analysts’ expectations are rational has been subject of
several empirical studies.1 The main finding is that analysts’ forecasts can be
biased and inefficient with respect to variables in the information set of the
analysts, including previous forecast errors. If the analysts do not use available
information efficiently when making forecasts, their forecast errors would be
serially correlated. Indeed, several studies on the statistical properties of an-
alysts’ earnings forecasts by Abarbanell and Bernard (1992), Easterwood and
Nutt (1999), Ali et al. (1992), Lys and Sohn (1990) and Mendenhall (1991) find
evidence that the forecast errors of analysts are positively autocorrelated.
While from an empirical point of view the evidence on serially correlated
forecast errors is undisputable, its theoretical explanation remains controversial.
Exploring the question why forecasters make systematic forecast errors some
recent studies consider the possibility that analysts underreact to information
about future earnings contained in previous earnings and price realizations.
For example, Mendenhall (1991), Abarbanell and Bernard (1992), and Ali et
al. (1992) document evidence that analysts underreact to earnings news by
underestimating the persistence of their earnings forecast errors. Further, Lys
and Sohn (1990), Abarbanell (1991), and Ali et al. (1992) document evidence
that analysts’ forecast errors are related to past changes in the stock prices,
which indicates that analysts underreact to information impounded in market
prices.
This paper contributes to the literature seeking explanations for the analysts’
underreaction by offering a rational economic explanation for their forecasting
behavior. We assume that analysts aiming to provide precise forecasts up-
date their expectations based on the managerial guidance regarding the future
prospect of the firm. This guidance is provided by managers aiming to reduce
the short–term volatility of their firm’s shares, mainly driven by the behavior of
noise traders. Introducing a random dynamical system compiling the demand of
noise and fundamental traders adapting the earnings expectations of the guided
analyst, we show that managerial guidance may increase the precision of the
analysts’ forecasts. However, it may also increase the effect estimated empiri-
cally as analysts’ underreaction. In particular, if the manager provide guidance
to analysts, their forecast errors will be positively autocorrelated. The effect is
expected to differ among firms with different exposure to noise traders.
To estimate the differences in the guiding policies of the firms in our sample
we use the Generalized Maximum Entropy (GME) approach suggested by Golan,
Judge and Miller (1996). The results suggest that the managers of growth firms
provide stronger guidance than the managers of value firms probably because
the impact of noise traders is stronger for growth than for value firms. In the
context of our model, this result implies that analysts forecasting the earnings
of growth firms have more precise forecasts than analysts following value firms.
However, their forecast are expected to be more inefficient due to the stronger
guidance of the growth firm managers.
Previous studies aiming to explain the analysts’ underreaction search for
1See Ramnath, Rock and Shane (2006) for a comprehensive overview on the analysts’
decision process, the distribution of analysts’ forecasts, and the informativeness and efficiency
of their output.
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its origins in psychological biases in individual decision making. For example,
Elliot, Phalbrick, and Wiedman (1995) suggest that the observed underreaction
of the analysts is due to judgemental biases, which hinders analysts to revise
their forecasts sufficiently. Additionally, many experimental studies suggest
circumstances where psychological biases such as conservatism and anchoring
cause analysts to underreact (e.g. Maines and Hand 1996).
Other studies suggest incentive-based explanations. Based on the assump-
tion that analysts have an asymmetric loss function with respect to their fore-
casting accuracy Raedy, Shane and Yang (2006) show that analysts maximizing
their reputation restrain their forecast revisions so that analysts’ forecasts ex-
hibit rationally an underreaction to new information.
Our paper does not require analysts to be exposed to any behavioral biases
nor to have an asymmetric loss function, which is difficult to be motivated.
In our model, the analysts’ underreaction is the result of the optimal guiding
policy of managers aiming to minimize the short-term swings in the price of their
firm’s shares. If the analysts believe that the manager of the firm they follow has
superior knowledge about the future prospect of the firm and does not behave
strategically when disclosing this information, they will follow the guidance to
increase the precision of their forecast. The manager needs to guide the analysts
and influence the demand of fundamental traders in order to dampen the effect
of noise traders. Specifically, after price increases (decreases), the manager
needs to guide the analysts’ expectations down (up) in order to decrease the
volatility of the firm’s price. Thus, when analysts update their forecasts in
the light of increasing (decreasing) prices their forecasts may be systematically
lower (higher) than the earnings realizations. However, this inefficiency of the
analysts’ forecasts is not irrational given that it is the result of the optimal
guiding policy of the manager to analysts aiming to increase the precision of
their forecasts.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section provides
background on the determinants and impact of managerial guidance. Section 3
describes the model. Section 4 analyzes the impact of managerial guidance on
the analysts’ forecast errors in the context of our model. Section 5 describes the
estimation procedure used to calibrate the model. The estimation results are
presented in section 7. Section 8 discuss the results in the context of our model
and section 9 concludes.
2 Determinants and Impact of Managerial Guid-
ance
Managers release information that is not required by regulatory standards. This
voluntary disclosure includes earnings estimates but also more general informa-
tion such as qualitative information about market conditions, trend information
that may affect the business, industry specific information, quantitative infor-
mation on business measures and assumptions, or forecasts of factors that may
drive future earnings. This information is usually disseminated on conference
calls and has a significant impact on the forecast errors of the analysts (see for
example Bowen et al., 2002). To the extent that such managers’ assessments on
the future performance of the firm affect the expectations of firm’s outsiders,
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they represent managerial guidance.
To get an intuition on the managers’ incentives to guide firm’s outsiders, we
consider the evidence of surveys analyzing managers’ investors relations poli-
cies. For example, Hsieh, Koller and Rajan (2005) show that executives at-
tribute the benefits of providing guidance to a higher valuation, lower volatility
and improved liquidity. In a larger survey conducted by the National Investor
Relations Institute (NIRI) in Summer 2006, 62% of the surveyed 654 managers
respond that they provide guidance in order to decrease the volatility of the
firm’s stock price.
The volatility of stock prices is driven by the investors’ demand for firm’s
shares. If some investors trade on changes in fundamentals but others trade on
pure noise, then firm’s prices will be excessively volatile (see De Long et al.,
1990). This volatility is one of the main concern of firms’ managers. Thus, their
guiding policy is expected to be closely linked to the activities of noise traders
on the stock market.
Price changes and thus stock price volatility is also closely linked to earn-
ings surprises. This relationship is evident in empirical studies on the prominent
post-earnings-announcement drift, i.e. the tendency of stock prices to drift in
the same direction as the earnings surprise. Thus, managers concerned with
the volatility of their stock prices need to focus on minimizing earnings sur-
prises. This can be done either by manipulating the reported earnings and/or
by managing the expectations of the analysts regarding the next period earn-
ings. Here, we assume that the manager of the firm focuses on guiding the
analysts’ forecasts and does not manipulate the reported earnings.
Several empirical studies show that managers are pretty successful in man-
aging the expectations of the analysts. In a recent study Cotter et al. (2006)
explore the timing and the extent of analysts’ reaction to public managerial
guidance and suggest a direct connection between the management information
releases and the analysts’ revision. Williams (1996) studies analysts’ forecast re-
visions in the month before and in the month after the managers’ guidance and
finds considerable level of revisions in the analysts’ earnings forecasts. Earlier
studies by Hassell, Jennings and Lasser (1988) and Baginski and Hassell (1990)
provide additional evidence that analysts revise their estimates as a response to
management forecasts.
The following section specifies the manager’s incentives to guide firm’s out-
siders in a theoretical framework.
3 Model Setup
To analyze the manager’s incentives for guidance we model a simple economy
with one manager and many investors trading the shares of the firm. In the
tradition of Brock and Hommes (1998) we assume that some of the investors
judge the prospects of the firm based on its earnings potential (fundamental
traders); the rest of the investors make trading decisions based on past changes
in the price of firm’s shares (noise traders).
The manager can influence his firm’s market price only if he manages the
expectations of the fundamental traders. We assume that the fundamental
traders update their expectations based on the earnings estimates of the analysts
following the firm. Thus, to manage the market price of his firm’s shares a
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manager needs to influence the expectations of the analysts regarding the next
period earnings.
We specify the manager’s problem as a linear quadratic control problem
consisting of an objective function, a state equation describing the dynamics
of firm’s price changes and a feedback rule governing the guidance response
of the managers to previous firm’s price changes. In particular, we define the
manager’s objective function as
min
Gt
W = E
{ ∞∑
t=1
δtb(pt − pt−1)2
}
(1)
where Gt is a control variable describing manager’s guidance, pt is the price
of firm’s shares in period t, δt is a discount factor, and b > 0 is an unknown
parameter reflecting the manager’s preferences with respect to the variance of
price changes.
The state equation describes the dynamics of the firm’s price changes. In our
model the market price of the firm is determined by the demand for firm’s shares,
which depends on the cumulative demand of the noise and fundamental traders.
The demand of the noise traders is driven by their expectations regarding the
next period price, which are defined as:
EN (pt+1 − pt) = a(pt − pt−1) (2)
where a ≥ 0 is an unknown parameter describing the impact of previous price
changes on the traders’ demand for firm’s shares. In the following, we specify
the noise traders as positive feedback traders. This is consistent with the empir-
ical evidence that the autocorrelation of returns reverse in dependence on the
volatility (see Sentana and Wadhwani, 1992), which indicates the presence of
positive feedback traders on the market.
To the extend that the fundamental value of the firm depends on the present
value of the firm’s earnings, the expectations of the fundamental traders regard-
ing the next period price is determined by changes in their earnings expectations.
The latter are assumed to be driven by changes in the consensus forecast of the
analysts following the firm, i.e.
EF (pt+1 − pt) = cEG(et+1 − et) (3)
The response of the fundamental traders to changes in the earnings expecta-
tions of the analysts EG(.) is given by the parameter c > 0. If the analysts’
consensus forecasts increases (decreases) by a unit, the firm’s value estimated
by the fundamental traders increases (decreases) as well so that their overall
demand for firm’s shares increases (decreases) by c units.
We implement the market clearing through Walrasian tattonnement based
on the overall demand for firm’s shares given by (2) and (3). Using in addition
the assumption that analysts’ forecasts are subject to manager’s guidance as
defined by the function Gt, i.e.
EG(et+1 − et) = Gt (4)
we get a dynamical system for the evolution of firm’s price changes through
time
pt+1 − pt = a(pt − pt−1) + cG∗t + ε1t (5)
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where ε1t ∼ N(0, σ2ε1t) is a noise term and G∗t is a feedback or control rule. It
describes the optimal guidance response of the manager to price changes. It is
specified as
G∗t = g(pt − pt−1) + ε2t (6)
where g is an unknown parameter and ε2t ∼ N(0, σ2ε2t) is a noise term.
The manager’s control problem is therefore given by the manager’s objective
function
min
g∗
W = E
{ ∞∑
t=1
δtb(pt − pt−1)2
}
(7)
the state equation (5) and the feedback rule (6). Following Chow (1975), we
get that the optimal control reaches a steady–state in the sense of having Gt
invariant over time if
g∗ = −a
c
(8)
and
b = −h+ δ(α+ cg)2h (9)
where h is a Lagrange multiplier. The first condition states that in steady–
state, the intensity of the manager’s guidance must neutralize the demand of
the positive feedback traders by changing the analysts’ consensus forecasts, i.e.
the demand of the fundamental traders. The second condition states the ”pain”
that the manager experiences facing the uncertainty in the price changes driven
by positive feedback traders while guiding the analysts. Both relations are used
together with the state equation (5) and the feedback rule (6) as consistency
conditions to estimate the unknown parameters of the model.
Note that in our economy with managers guiding the expectations of the
fundamental investors, firms’ market prices are not predictable although there
are some positive feedback traders investing systematically. The activities of
these noise traders do not have any impact on the market prices, if the managers’
guidance is optimal. Given the managers’ objective to minimize the variance of
stock price changes, their guidance needs to neutralize the impact of the positive
feedback traders on the market price of the firm. In this case, firms’ price
changes will not be correlated over time although there are positive feedback
traders on the market.
4 The Impact of Managerial Guidance on the
Analysts’ Forecast Errors
The specification of the manager’s guiding policy in the previous section allows
us to analyze its impact on the precision and the efficiency of the analysts’
earnings forecasts.
Per definition, the analysts’ forecast error is equal to:
zt = et − EG(et) (10)
or
zt = ∆et − EG(∆et) (11)
where ∆et := et − et−1.
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Then, using equations (4) and (6), the forecast error of the analysts can also
be written as:
zt = ∆et − g(∆pt−1) (12)
where ∆pt−1 := pt−1 − pt−2. Thus, analysts following the managerial guidance
may increase the precision of their forecasts if the market price of the firm at
the time of the forecasting falls (increases) but the trend of earnings growth is
positive (negative).
Result 1. If the current market price of the firm goes into the opposite direction
as the earnings trend, the analysts following the managerial guidance produce
lower forecast errors.
Although the guidance of the manager may increase the precision of the an-
alysts forecasts, it has a negative impact on their efficiency. In the following we
show that analysts’ forecasts based on the guidance by managers are positively
autocorrelated.
Forecast errors exhibit a positive autocorrelation if:
Et−1(ztzt+1) = Et−1(∆et − g∆pt−1)(∆et+1 − g∆pt) > 0 (13)
or
Et−1(ztzt+1) = Et−1(∆et∆et+1)− Et−1(g∆et∆pt) (14)
−Et−1(g∆pt−1∆et+1) + Et−1(g2∆pt−1∆pt) > 0
We assume that the firm’s earnings follow a (seasonal) random walk with a drift,
i.e.
et = µ+ et−1 + εt (15)
where εt ∼ N(0, σε) is white noise.
The first term of the equation is equivalent to
Et−1(∆et∆et+1) = µ2
The second term of the equation is equivalent to
Et−1(g∆et∆pt) = gEt−1[∆et((a+ cg)∆pt−1 + εt1)] = g[µ(a+ cg)]∆pt−1 = 0
given the optimal guidance policy g = −ac .
The third term of the equation is
Et−1(g∆pt−1∆et+1) = gµ∆pt−1
The last term is
g2∆pt−1Et−1(∆pt) = 0
since under optimal guiding Et−1(∆pt) = 0. Thus, the forecast errors are posi-
tively autocorrelated if
Et−1(ztzt+1) = µ2 − µg∆pt−1 > 0 (16)
This is true for − |µ||g| < ∆pt−1 < |µ||g| .
If we focus on stocks with a positive earnings drift, i.e. µ > 0, the analysts’
forecast errors will be positively autocorrelated, when firm’s prices increase as
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well. For example, in a boom market when earnings tend to increase and the
market price of firm’s shares increase as well, managers need to guide analysts’
expectations down. As a result, analysts’ forecasts will be systematically too
low, i.e. the analysts underreact. If the price of the firm decreases although the
earnings drift is positive, the managers need to guide the expectations of the
analysts up in order to dampen the effect of the positive feedback traders betting
on further decreasing prices. This guidance reduces the forecast error of the
analysts as discussed above, but given that the impact of the positive feedback
traders is limited and there are no large negative shocks in the economy so
that the optimal guidance is not that strong, analysts’ forecasts will be too low
again. Thus, analysts’ following the managerial guidance would have positively
correlated forecast errors.
Result 2. There is a positive autocorrelation in the analysts’ forecast errors if
there is a price change supporting the earnings trend. If this condition does not
hold, the forecast errors of the analysts will be positively autocorrelated if the
positive feedback traders do not dominate the market so that the manager does
not need to guide too strongly.
Note that if positive feedback traders dominate the market, then the man-
ager needs to guide stronger when prices decline. Consequently, the analysts’
forecasts may increase above the mean earnings growth, i.e. the analysts’ fore-
cast will be too high. Given the positive forecast error in the previous period,
analysts’ forecast errors will then exhibit a negative autocorrelation.
In the literature, the relationship between analysts’ forecast errors and pre-
vious realizations of variables known by the analysts is used as an indicator
for inefficient forecasting. Several empirical studies analyzing the properties
of analysts forecasts find a significant positive relationship between the ana-
lysts’ forecast errors and the firm’s performance and also between the analysts’
forecast errors in two subsequent periods (see Abarbanell and Bernard, 1992;
Easterwood and Nutt, 1999; Ali, Klein and Rosenfeld, 1992; Lys and Sohn, 1990
and Mendenhall, 1991). A common explanation for this empirical result is that
the analysts underreact to information, i.e. analysts’ systematically underesti-
mate the trend in the firm’s performance probably because of some behavioral
bias. As a consequence, after a positive (negative) firm’s performance the fore-
cast error is positive (negative). The same relationship can be observed in our
model as well: If the firm’s performance has a positive (negative) trend, the
forecast error of the analysts will be positive (negative) when the current price
change supports the development of the firm’s performance or if the current price
decreases (increases) but only moderately, for example because of the limited
impact of positive feedback traders. Note that our explanation of the observed
relationship does not require analysts to be exposed to any behavioral bias. In
our model, the relationship is observed because managers provide guidance to
firm’s outsiders in order to dampen the effect of the positive feedback traders
increasing the variance of firm’s price changes.
To estimate whether the proposed relationship can be explained by manage-
rial guidance, we study the price dynamics of different firms in order to recover
the unknown parameters of the problem along with the parameter of the feed-
back rule. We expect to see significant differences in the preferences and in the
guiding policies of firms with different levels of uncertainty in their earnings and
price growth. Such differences can be observed for example by growth and value
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stocks. To the extent that earnings are uncertain and the firm is difficult to be
evaluated on the basis of fundamentals, there will be more investors evaluat-
ing the firm on the basis of its past performance. According to our model, the
managers of such firms would have stronger incentives to provide guidance since
it reduces the impact of the positive feedback traders on the variance of stock
price changes. The implications for the analysts’ forecasts is then analyzed in
the context of our model.
5 Estimation Procedure
To estimate the unknown parameters of the model we propose the use of the
Generalized Maximum Entropy (GME) estimation method as described by
Golan, Judge and Miller (1996). The basic objective of the method is to es-
timate the unknown parameters with minimal distributional and sampling as-
sumptions. This objective is similar in philosophy to other approaches as for
example the Generalized Method of Moments, where the basic objective is first
to search for the ”natural weight” of each observation and then to use it in order
to form an empirical likelihood based on some moments. In contrast, the GME
does not use any moments or side–conditions a priori. Instead with the GME
one maximizes the traditional entropy functional but subject to noisy moment
representations, without imposing any sampling assumptions or zero moment
conditions.
The principle of maximum entropy is based on the idea that when estimating
the probability distribution of the model parameters from a sample one should
select the distribution, which leaves the largest remaining uncertainty (maxi-
mum entropy) consistent with some constrains. Under this criterion, there are
no additional assumptions or biases introduced in the estimation. Additionally,
the estimation can be done without imposing assumptions on the underlying
data generation process. Thus, given the linear-quadratic model in (7), (5)
and (6), we estimate the unknown parameters without imposing assumptions
regarding the exact relationship between sample and population moments. As-
suming that the parameters and the noise terms with unknown distributions
are both unknown, we aim to recover them simultaneously from the price data
of a particular firm.
To achieve this goal we reformulate the unknown parameters and noise terms
as discrete random variables with finite supports. Accordingly, we may write
the control problem in terms of the random variables. The estimation problem
is then to recover the probability distributions for the unknown parameters and
noise terms that reconciles the available information with the observed sample
information. At the optimum, the probabilities satisfy some consistency con-
straints, which are given by the state equation (5), the feedback rule (6) and the
steady–state conditions (8) and (23). Given these probability distributions and
the supports used in the estimation we can recover the parameters of the model.
A precise description of the estimation procedure is given in the appendix.
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6 Data and Descriptive Statistics
To recover the unknown parameters of the linear quadratic control problem
defined in (1), (5) and (6) for different firms, we use quarterly price data from
Datasteam starting in the third quarter of 2000 and ending at the forth quarter
of 2006. We choose the third quarter of 2000 as a starting date since in October
2000 the SEC introduced the Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD) prohibiting
the private dialog between managers and analysts. We expect that after Reg
FD, the market reaction to earnings forecasts and announcements changes since
the dissemination of information is intensified. Previous research by Heflin et al.
(2003) support this view. They observe that after Reg FD the return volatility
after earnings announcements, which is part of the manager’s objective function,
has decreased. This result indicates that the effect of managers’ guidance may
differ prior and after Reg FD. We take this into account by focusing on the
period after Reg FD.
We limit our analysis on firms using the US GAAP reporting standard and
choose 40 firms included in the S&P 500 Index. The selection is done based on
two criteria: the firms’ market capitalization as of December 2006 and the firms’
fundamentals relative to their market value. We focus on the largest firms in the
index to keep the group homogenous with respect to size since large firms are
usually covered by more analysts than small and mid–cap firms. The market
capitalization of the firms in our sample ranges between 34$ billions and 422$
billions.
To distinguish whether a firm is a value or a growth firm, we use the
S&P500/Citigroup Growth and Value Indices. The main advantage of these
indices is that firms’ classification is based not only on the price-to-book ratios
of the firms but also on additional variables.2
Table 1 provides summary statistics on the quarterly price changes of the
growth firms included in our sample.
2The growth criteria are the five-years historical earnings per share growth rate, sales per
share growth rate and the five years average annual internal growth rate. The value criteria
are the book value per share to price, the sales per share to price, the cash flow per share to
price, and the dividend yield.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics Growth Stocks
The summary statistics are calculated for changes in quarterly prices. For the time
period from Q1 2002 to Q4 2006 there are 26 observations. Mean and median
values in italic are statistically different from zero at the 5% confidence level. The
Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test statistic is performed for an intercept and a
trend with maximum 5 lags. The p–values are reported in parenthesis.
Mean Median StDev Skew. Kurt. JB-stat ADF-test
AIG -0.378 -0.035 9.064 0.002 1.929 1.242 (0.538) -6.199 (0.000)
Am.Express 0.414 1.865 4.488 -0.921 3.527 3.976 (0.137) -4.636 (0.006)
Amgen 0.812 -0.725 8.654 0.725 3.569 2.628 (0.269) -6.832 (0.000)
Cisco -1.604 0.070 6.749 -1.823 6.411 27.02 (0.000) -4.765 (0.004)
Comcast -0.067 0.175 4.402 -0.449 2.499 1.145 (0.564) -4.693 (0.005)
Dell 1.173 1.860 3.290 -0.145 3.126 0.109 (0.947) -6.017 (0.000)
EBay 0.496 0.013 5.668 -0.168 2.222 0.779 (0.677) -1.004 (0.922)
Exxon 1.173 1.860 3.290 -0.145 3.126 0.109 (0.947) -6.017 (0.000)
HomeDepot -0.862 0.445 6.838 -1.222 4.189 8.008 (0.018) -6.489 (0.000)
IBM -0.805 0.715 11.093 -0.349 3.100 0.538 (0.764) -5.549 (0.001)
J&J 1.026 1.233 5.059 -1.037 4.703 7.801 (0.020) -6.695 (0.000)
Lowe’s 0.629 0.045 3.162 0.256 2.050 1.262 (0.532) -4.699 (0.007)
Medtronic -0.154 0.285 4.270 -0.616 3.216 1.694 (0.429) -7.072 (0.000)
Oracle -0.737 0.119 3.536 -1.623 6.110 21.90 (0.000) -6.757 (0.000)
Pepsico 1.008 1.255 4.199 -0.993 4.865 8.040 (0.018) -6.861 (0.000)
P&G 1.201 1.123 3.123 -0.045 2.774 0.064 (0.969) -4.663 (0.007)
Un.Health 1.542 1.983 3.291 -0.756 5.551 9.530 (0.009) -4.608 (0.006)
Walgreen 0.532 0.760 3.921 -0.112 2.996 0.054 (0.973) -5.767 (0.000)
Wal Mart -0.340 -0.420 5.817 -0.293 2.687 0.479 (0.787) -9.716 (0.000)
Yahoo -1.452 -0.407 9.075 -3.373 15.479 217.9 (0.000) -5.109 (0.002)
The average firms’ price changes range between -1.6 and 1.5 with standard
deviations between 3.1 and 11.1. The skewness and kurtosis range between -
3.4 and 0.7 respectively between 1.9 and 15.5 indicating that the price changes
of some firms are probably not normal distributed. However, the JB-statistic
shows that the price changes of most of the firms are not statistically different
from the normal distribution. Further, firms’ price changes do not have a unit
root according to the ADF-statistic except for one firm. This allows us to use
ordinary least squares to estimate the autocorrelation of firms’ price changes.
The results reported in Table 2 suggest that price changes of most of the growth
firms in our sample do not depend on their previous realizations. Including
higher lags in the analysis does not change the conclusion that firms’ quarterly
price changes are not autocorrelated over time.
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Table 2: Autocorrelation in Price Changes of Growth Stocks
pt − pt−1 = c0 +
∑3
i=0 ci(pt−i − pt−i−1).
The Breusch–Godfrey (BG) statistic is calculated with 3 lags. P–values are
reported in parenthesis.
c0 c1 c2 c3 BG-test
AIG -1.781 (0.350) -0.383 (0.117) -0.210 (0.349) -0.007 (0.975) 0.449 (0.772)
Am.Express 0.639 (0.492) 0.072 (0.729) -0.084 (0.684) 0.255 (0.227) 2.477 (0.099)
Amgen 0.505 (0.762) -0.105 (0.637) 0.074 (0.737) -0.366 (0.085) 0.917 (0.455)
Cisco -0.248 (0.829) 0.170 (0.407) 0.423 (0.021) -0.345 (0.056) 2.392 (0.107)
Comcast -0.263 (0.780) 0.083 (0.726) -0.146 (0.519) -0.256 (0.252) 0.255 (0.856)
Dell 0.848 (0.279) 0.048 (0.838) 0.293 (0.181) 0.075 (0.733) 0.338 (0.798)
EBay 0.785 (0.561) -0.234 (0.312) -0.090 (0.730) 0.248 (0.368) 2.787 (0.074)
Exxon 0.848 (0.279) 0.048 (0.838) 0.293 (0.181) 0.075 (0.733) 0.338 (0.798)
HomeDepot -0.507 (0.710) -0.292 (0.216) -0.041 (0.846) -0.038 (0.846) 0.280 (0.839)
IBM -0.922 (0.656) 0.002 (0.993) -0.233 (0.233) 0.141 (0.481) 0.095 (0.962)
J&J 1.318 (0.244) -0.260 (0.276) 0.082 (0.741) -0.270 (0.255) 0.623 (0.610)
Lowe’s 1.140 (0.163) -0.431 (0.077) 0.019 (0.942) -0.024 (0.915) 3.228 (0.050)
Medtronic -0.321 (0.732) -0.446 (0.065) -0.167 (0.513) -0.019 (0.939) 1.722 (0.203)
Oracle -0.219 (0.794) -0.027 (0.905) 0.375 (0.092) -0.077 (0.738) 12.22 (0.000)
Pepsico 1.250 (0.183) -0.433 (0.074) -0.211 (0.398) 0.004 (0.984) 0.304 (0.822)
P&G 1.903 (0.032) -0.366 (0.141) -0.320 (0.187) 0.022 (0.923) 5.368 (0.009)
Un.Health 1.124 (0.376) -0.001 (0.996) 0.032 (0.893) 0.130 (0.693) 1.146 (0.361)
Walgreen 0.431 (0.574) -0.269 (0.231) 0.031 (0.882) -0.354 (0.091) 1.368 (0.288)
Wal Mart -0.166 (0.855) -0.758 (0.005) -0.078 (0.765) 0.099 (0.615) 0.486 (0.697)
Yahoo 0.540 (0.364) 0.189 (0.406) 0.244 (0.006) -0.061 (0.443) 0.824 (0.500)
Summary statistics for the value firms are provided in Table 3.
Table 3: Summary Statistics of Value Stocks
The summary statistics are calculated for changes in quarterly prices. For the time
period from Q1 2002 to Q4 2006 there are 26 observations. Mean and median
values in italic are statistically different from zero at the 5% confidence level. The
Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test statistic is performed for an intercept and a
trend with maximum 5 lags. The p–values are reported in parenthesis.
Mean Median StDev Skew. Kurt. JB-stat ADF-test
AT&T -0.408 -0.57 3.85 0.658 4.458 4.179 (0.124) -5.216 (0.002)
Bank of America 1.049 1.365 2.528 -0.400 3.039 0.694 (0.707) -6.170 (0.000)
Bristol Myers -0.935 -0.183 5.528 -0.479 5.034 5.480 (0.065) -5.207 (0.003)
Citigroup 0.221 0.365 4.494 -0.858 4.742 6.476 (0.039) -5.422 (0.001)
ConocoPhilips 1.462 1.175 3.675 0.095 3.645 0.490 (0.783) -3.683 (0.043)
Duke Energy 0.105 0.980 4.749 -1.147 6.285 17.39 (0.000) -5.487 (0.001)
Du Pont -0.231 -0.363 3.407 -0.272 2.489 0.603 (0.740) -6.489 (0.000)
Fannie Mae -0.224 -1.075 7.392 0.571 3.478 1.661 (0.436) -7.080 (0.000)
Hewlett Packert -0.590 -0.015 5.198 -0.653 3.025 1.847 (0.397) -6.318 (0.000)
JPMorgan Chase -0.184 -0.060 5.296 -0.154 4.087 1.383 (0.501) -3.948 (0.029)
Merck -0.867 0.533 6.621 0.105 3.150 0.072 (0.965) -4.987 (0.003)
Merrill Lynch 1.257 3.390 8.035 -0.063 1.843 1.467 (0.480) -5.598 (0.001)
Morgan Stanley -0.093 0.735 8.146 -0.709 3.589 2.551 (0.279) -4.437 (0.010)
Motorola -0.385 0.330 3.881 -2.025 8.125 46.22 (0.000) -8.236 (0.000)
Sprint Nextel -1.429 -0.472 4.824 -2.162 7.558 42.75 (0.000) -4.453 (0.008)
Time Warner -1.583 -0.660 4.776 -0.195 2.719 0.250 (0.882) -3.752 (0.042)
Tyco -0.727 0.025 6.785 -1.750 6.867 29.47 (0.000) -3.865 (0.030)
Verizon -0.948 -0.050 5.099 -0.967 4.515 6.539 (0.038) -6.103 (0.000)
Washington Mut. 0.965 1.645 3.852 -0.753 3.253 2.529 (0.282) -6.629 (0.000)
Wells Fargo 0.571 0.763 1.650 0.011 2.351 0.457 (0.796) -6.198 (0.000)
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The average price changes of the value firms range between -1.6 and 1.5
with standard deviations between 1.6 and 8.1. The skewness and kurtosis range
between -2.2 and 0.7 respectively between 1.8 and 8.1 indicating that the price
changes of some firms are probably not normal distributed. However, most of
the value firms have price changes that are statistically not different from the
normal distribution according to the JB-statistic. Further, according to the
ADF-statistic, the price changes of the value firms included in our sample do
not have a unit root. This allows us to use ordinary least squares to estimate the
autocorrelation of firms’ price changes. The results reported in Table 4 suggest
that as in the case of growth firms the price changes of most of the value firms
in our sample do not depend on their previous realizations. Including higher
lags in the analysis does not change the conclusion that firms’ quarterly price
changes are not autocorrelated over time.
Table 4: Autocorrelation in Price Changes of Value Stocks
pt − pt−1 = c0 +
∑3
i=0 ci(pt−i − pt−i−1).
The Breusch–Godfrey (BG) statistic is calculated with 3 lags. P–values are
reported in parenthesis.
c0 c1 c2 c3 BG-test
AT&T 0.296 (0.617) 0.437 (0.023) 0.017 (0.906) 0.418 (0.007) 0.758 (0.534)
Bank of America 1.717 (0.033) -0.331 (0.182) -0.059 (0.816) -0.021 (0.924) 2.696 (0.081)
Bristol Myers -0.956 (0.361) 0.538 (0.025) -0.410 (0.042) 0.196 (0.300) 0.841 (0.491)
Citigroup -0.039 (0.970) -0.094 (0.684) -0.097 (0.675) -0.004 (0.987) 0.453 (0.719)
ConocoPhilips 0.752 (0.436) 0.312 (0.196) 0.021 (0.925) 0.109 (0.630) 0.396 (0.758)
Duke Energy -0.261 (0.776) -0.022 (0.925) 0.356 (0.074) -0.140 (0.493) 1.139 (0.363)
Du Pont -0.010 (0.987) -0.554 (0.028) -0.479 (0.047) -0.245 (0.263) 0.732 (0.548)
Fannie Mae -1.152 (0.371) -0.415 (0.083) 0.200 (0.298) 0.196 (0.292) 0.124 (0.944)
Hewlett Packert 0.681 (0.445) -0.089 (0.688) 0.285 (0.127) 0.223 (0.211) 1.778 (0.192)
JPMorgan Chase -0.198 (0.836) 0.138 (0.477) 0.153 (0.388) 0.037 (0.836) 1.642 (0.219)
Merck -1.709 (0.270) -0.014 (0.955) -0.054 (0.798) -0.156 (0.459) 0.416 (0.744)
Merrill Lynch 0.457 (0.798) -0.03 (0.899) -0.093 (0.700) 0.126 (0.585) 2.819 (0.072)
Morgan Stanley 0.162 (0.915) 0.166 (0.495) 0.352 (0.097) -0.177 (0.395) 3.195 (0.052)
Motorola 0.331 (0.561) -0.066 (0.779) 0.302 (0.041) 0.047 (0.761) 1.48 (0.258)
Sprint Nextel 0.026 (0.962) -0.149 (0.519) 0.057 (0.750) 0.145 (0.282) 0.589 (0.631)
Time Warner -0.681 (0.501) 0.177 (0.376) 0.265 (0.165) 0.105 (0.578) 2.474 (0.099)
Tyco -1.253 (0.417) 0.277 (0.226) -0.141 (0.545) 0.007 (0.975) 1.265 (0.320)
Verizon -0.664 (0.553) -0.111 (0.647) 0.005 (0.982) -0.018 (0.929) 1.067 (0.391)
Washington Mut. 0.771 (0.368) -0.450 (0.048) -0.006 (0.977) -0.005 (0.981) 1.918 (0.167)
Wells Fargo 0.932 (0.032) -0.332 (0.118) -0.255 (0.261) -0.287 (0.196) 0.201 (0.894)
The missing autocorrelation of price changes of growth and value stocks is
consistent with our model since optimal guidance neutralizes the effect of the
positive feedback traders on the price dynamics of the firm. If the manager of
the firm does not intervene against the activities of positive feedback traders,
we would observe a positive autocorrelation of stock price changes. The auto-
correlation would be negative if the guidance is too strong relative to the impact
of the positive feedback traders on stock prices. Both guiding policies cannot
be considered as rational given the manager’s control problem.
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7 Estimation Results
The estimation procedure described in section 5 and in the appendix is applied
to estimate the unknown parameters of the optimal control problem that the
managers of different value and growth firms need to solve when deciding their
guiding strategies. The GME approach requires to specify the support of each
of the unknowns in order to reflect prior knowledge about the parameters. Since
our model does not provide specific restrictions on the upper and lower bounds
on the parameter space, we run the estimation for a variety of plausible bounds.
For each combination of bounds we estimate the coefficients and calculate the
corresponding entropy.
We choose six supports in equidistant fashion for each of the parameters
subject to estimation. We first use broad supports and then refine them while
evaluating changes in the corresponding entropy. For the parameter a we choose
the supports
za = (0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, 0.9, 1.0)
za = (0.05, 0.1, 0.15, 0.2, 0.25, 0.3)
za = (0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 1.0)
The parameter g is estimated over the supports
zg = (−1,−0.9,−0.7,−0.5,−0.3,−0.1)
zg = (−0.3,−0.25,−0.2,−0.15,−0.1,−0.05)
zg = (−1,−0.8,−0.7,−0.6,−0.5,−0.4)
For the parameters b and h we use the supports
zb = (0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, 0.9, 1)
zb = (0.5, 1, 1.5, 2, 2.5, 3)
zh = (−1,−0.9,−0.7,−0.5,−0.3,−0.1)
zh = (−3,−2.5,−2,−1.5,−1,−0.5)
The supports for both noise terms are chosen symmetrically around zero, i.e.
ve = (−0.5,−0.25,−0.1, 0.1, 0.25, 0.5)
The parameter c reflecting the demand response of the fundamental traders
to the earnings estimates of the guided analysts is set to be equal to 1. This
assumption is not restrictive given that the manager knows how the fundamental
traders respond to the provided guidance. In this case the manager can adjust
his guidance policy captured by the parameter g and take into account the
expectations of the fundamental traders in order to influence the next period
price.
Combining the different support sets, we get eighteen different coefficient
estimates with corresponding entropies for each firm in the sample. The coef-
ficients estimates with the lowest entropy for the growth and value stocks in
our sample are reported in Table 5 respectively in Table 6.3 For focus is on
3The full sample of estimates is available upon request.
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the coefficients g and b since according to the steady–state conditions of the
problem and the assumption that c = 1, a = −g and h = −b.
The estimated coefficients for the growth and value stocks are reported in
Tables 5 and 6 respectively. Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the estimation results
graphically.
Table 5: Coefficient Estimates for Growth Stocks
g b H
AIG -0.205 0.500 1.153
American Express -0.282 0.227 4.197
Amgen -0.057 0.776 3.718
Cisco -0.057 0.776 6.015
Comcast -0.300 0.744 6.450
Dell -0.429 0.774 5.226
EBay -0.282 0.227 7.841
Exxon -0.100 0.752 1.514
Home Depot -0.225 0.282 5.026
IBM -0.208 0.500 3.386
J&J -0.057 0.752 5.724
Lowe’s -0.192 0.500 6.446
Medtronic -0.429 0.772 7.333
Oracle -0.150 0.776 6.554
Pepsico -0.225 0.500 6.824
P&G -0.100 0.752 4.911
United Health -0.434 0.752 4.833
Walgreen -0.220 0.500 7.201
Wal Mart -0.438 0.752 5.637
Yahoo -0.205 0.500 3.509
Mean -0.230 0.606
Median -0.214 0.748
St.Dev. 0.127 0.196
Table 6: Estimated Coefficients for Value Stocks
g b H
AT&T -0.050 0.205 3.386
Bank of America -0.100 0.776 6.047
Bristol Myers -0.500 1.042 3.875
Citigroup -0.411 0.752 3.682
ConocoPhilips -0.100 0.227 8.608
Duke Energy -0.300 0.773 4.745
Du Pont -0.057 0.764 4.559
Fannie Mae -0.050 0.227 3.773
Hewlett Packert -0.100 0.773 1.832
JPMorgan Chase -0.196 0.500 6.565
Merck -0.400 0.201 4.367
Merrill Lynch -0.200 0.720 1.337
Morgan Stanley -0.057 0.772 6.486
Motorola -0.427 0.774 9.796
Sprint Nextel -0.050 0.205 8.340
Time Warner -0.050 0.213 9.461
Tyco -0.100 0.500 7.804
Verizon -0.057 0.776 4.319
Washington Mutual -0.300 0.683 4.103
Wells Fargo -0.192 0.500 8.522
Mean -0.178 0.554
Median -0.100 0.702
St.Dev. 0.154 0.280
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Figure 1: Estimated Guidance Policies of Growth and Value Stocks
The box portion of the boxplot represents the first and third quartiles. The median is depicted
using a line through the center of the box, while the mean is drawn using a symbol. The shaded
region displays approximate confidence intervals for the median. The bounds of the shaded
area are defined by the median +/ − 1.57 ∗ IQR/√N , where IQR is the difference between
the first and third quartile and N is the number of observations.
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Figure 2: Estimated Preferences of Growth and Value Managers
The box portion of the boxplot represents the first and third quartiles. The median is depicted
using a line through the center of the box, while the mean is drawn using a symbol. The shaded
region displays approximate confidence intervals for the median. The bounds of the shaded
area are defined by the median +/ − 1.57 ∗ IQR/√N , where IQR is the difference between
the first and third quartile and N is the number of observations.
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Table 7: Significance Tests
g b
F-Test (variances) 1.462 2.049
(0.415) (0.125)
Levene Test 1.846 6.604
(0.1823) (0.014)
T-Test (means) -1.165 -0.680
(0.126) (0.250)
Wilcoxon Mann-Whitney Test 133.5 219.5
(0.036) (0.306)
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test 0.350 0.200
(0.076) (0.348)
The average guidance coefficient estimated for the sample of growth firms
is equal to -0.230, which is greater in absolute terms compared to the corre-
sponding average for the sample of value firms equal to -0.178. Additionally,
the standard deviation of the estimated guidance of growth firm is lower than
the corresponding statistic in the value sample. These difference indicate that
the growth firms guide on average stronger than value firms and the guiding
policies of the growth firms is more homogenous than the guiding policies of the
value firms included in our sample.
To verify the significance of this result we first apply the F–Test and the
Levene Test to test the null hypothesis that the variances of both samples are
homogenous. Both tests indicate that we cannot reject the null hypothesis
under a reasonable level of risk. Thus, we can apply the Student t-test to
derive conclusions whether the observed differences in the average estimates of
both samples are statistically significant. We can reject the null hypothesis that
the means of the value and growth samples of estimates are equal under the
risk of 12.6%. We also apply two additional non–parametric tests to relax the
assumption that the differences between the samples are normally distributed.
With the Wilcoxon Mann-Whitney statistic we test whether the locations of
the distribution with growth estimates is on the right side of the distribution
with value estimates. We can reject the null hypothesis of identical distribution
functions under the risk of 3.6%. With the Kolmogorov-Smirnov-one-tailed test
we extend the analysis to compare any part of both distributions. We can reject
the null-hypothesis that the distribution of estimates in the growth sample is not
significantly lower than the distribution of estimates in the value sample under
the risk that it is true of 7.59%. Overall, we may conclude that the heterogeneity
of the guiding policies of the firms in the growth and value sample is similar,
but most of the growth firms guide stronger than the value firms.
Differences between value and growth firms are also observed with respect
to the managers’ variance aversion. Comparing the variance of the estimated
coefficients in each group, we find significant differences between the managers’
preferences in the growth and value sample, i.e the group of the growth managers
is more homogeneous than the group of the value managers. These managers
have also a higher aversion to variances in price changes than the value stocks
managers. Though, this difference is not statistically significant according to
the applied non–parametric tests.
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8 Discussion of the Estimation Results
The estimation results presented in the previous section suggest that growth
firms provide stronger guidance to the analysts. In our model, the motivation
for their guiding policy can either be driven by their preferences or by the power
of positive feedback traders increasing the variance of firm’s price changes. We
do not observe significant differences in the preferences of the value and growth
managers with respect to the variance of the firm’s price changes. Thus, the ob-
servation that growth firms’ managers guide stronger than value firms’ managers
can be explained with the stronger demand of positive feedback traders.
Positive feedback traders are expected to be more active in trading growth
stocks because growth stocks are usually more difficult to evaluate since most
of their assets are intangible. To the extent that the value and profitability of
firm’s assets is uncertain, investors trading the shares of the firm would be more
willingly to base their decisions on previous prices than on earnings forecasts of
the analysts. This is, the future market price of the firm would be dominated
by the expectations of the positive feedback traders and the impact of the fun-
damental investors would be limited. This motivates variance-averse managers
to intervene against the positive feedback traders by providing stronger guid-
ance to the analysts that in turn influence the expectations of the fundamental
traders.
The managerial guidance has a significant impact on the precision and effi-
ciency of analysts’ forecasts. Our first result in section 4 states that the stronger
the provided guidance the smaller is the analysts’ forecast error, given that
the current price grows in the opposite direction as the earnings drift, ceteris
paribus. For example, if the current price decreases (increases) although the
firm’s earnings tend to increase (decrease), the manager’s guidance increases
the precision of the analysts’ forecasts, see equation (12). We can use this re-
sult in the context of our estimations to derive a proposition on the relative
impact of guidance on the forecast errors of analysts following value and growth
stocks. If we assume that the earnings of value and growth stocks have both
either a positive or a negative drift, we propose that the forecast errors of the
analysts following growth firms should be lower than the forecast errors of the
analysts following value firms since according to our estimates, growth managers
guide stronger than value managers. Doukas, Kim and Penzalis (2002) provide
empirical evidence supporting our proposition.
The estimated differences in the guiding policies of value and growth man-
agers have additional implications for the efficiency of analysts’ forecasts as
stated in our second result in section 4. In a bull (bear) market when earn-
ings drift and current price changes are positive (negative), stronger guidance
means also a higher degree of autocorrelation of subsequent forecast errors, see
equation (16). Hence, we can expect that the inefficiency of forecasts observed
in the empirical literature would be more pronounced for analysts following
growth firms than for analysts estimating the earnings of value firms. Testing
this proposition is a subject of further research.
18
9 Conclusion
In this paper we estimate the guiding policy of different managers as the solu-
tion of an optimal control problem, in which managers minimize the variance of
their firms’ price changes. We use our model to derive conclusions on the prop-
erties of analysts’ forecasts errors. In particular, we show that optimal guidance
may explain why analysts’ forecast errors are correlated with previous forecast
errors or with past observations of the firm’s performance as observed by other
empirical studies. A common explanation for the observed inefficiency is that
analysts underreact to new information. In our model, the inefficiency occurs
as a response to guidance provided by managers minimizing the uncertainty in
the firm’s market prices. According to our model, the stronger the guidance
provided by the manager, the stronger is the autocorrelation of the analysts’
forecast errors.
The manager’s guiding policy and its implications for the analysts’ forecast
errors are analyzed in a linear dynamic system with control. We assume that
the price of firm’s shares is basically determined by positive feedback traders
increasing the variance of firm’s price changes and fundamental investors fol-
lowing the forecasts of the analysts. To minimize the variance of firm’s price
changes, the firm’s manager guides the earnings expectations of the analysts
following the firm. The parameters of the manager’s objective function, the
state equation governing the price changes and the feedback rule are recovered
simultaneously by using the GME estimating procedure. The results suggest
that the managers of growth firms provide stronger guidance to the analysts
than the managers of value firms since the market price of growth firms is more
likely to be determined by positive feedback traders than by fundamental in-
vestors. Using this result in the context of our model, we propose that contrary
to the error-in-expectations hypothesis analysts following growth stocks should
have more precise forecasts than analysts following value stocks. However, we
expect that due to the differences in the optimal guiding policies of value and
growth firms, the forecast errors of the analysts following growth firms will ex-
hibit stronger autocorrelation than the forecast errors of the analysts following
value firms. Since the analysts operate in an economy with managers aiming to
reduce the volatility in the their firm’s price deviations, we may conclude that
the observed autocorrelation is desirable and thus rational.
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Appendix
To calibrate the model, we first need to reformulate the unknown parameters
summarized in the vector β and noise terms summarized in the vector e so
that they have the properties of probabilities. In particular, we treat each of
the unknowns as a random variable with a compact support and 2 ≤ M ≤ ∞
respectively 2 ≤ J ≤ ∞ possible outcomes. Let the vector z = z1, ..., zM be a
set ofM points spanning the possible unknown value of the vector of parameters
β and the vector v = v1, ..., vJ be a set of J points spanning the possible values
of the vector of noise terms ε. Then, each of the k parameters can be written
as
βk =
M∑
m=1
pkmz
k
m (17)
and each of the n noise terms can be written as
en =
J∑
j=1
wnj v
n
j (18)
with
∑M
m=1 p
m
k = 1 and
∑J
j=1 w
j
n = 1. The estimation problem is to recover
the probability distributions for the unknown parameters and error terms that
reconcile the available prior information with the observed sample information.
Using the reparameterized unknowns and the steady–state conditions of the
linear-quadratic control problem we propose a GME solution to the problem
that selects the probabilities pk with k = a, b, c, g, h where h is a Lagrange
multiplier and wn with n = ε1, ε2 to maximize
H(pk, wn) = −
∑
k
∑
M
pkm ln(p
k
m)−
∑
n
∑
J
wnj ln(w
n
j ) (19)
subject to
yt =
M∑
m=1
pamz
a
myt−1 +Gt +
J∑
j=1
wε1j v
ε1
j (20)
Gt =
M∑
m=1
pgmz
g
myt−1 +
J∑
j=1
wε2j v
ε2
j (21)
where yt = pt − pt−1,
M∑
m=1
pgmz
g
m = −
M∑
m=1
pamz
a
m/
M∑
m=1
pcmz
c
m (22)
M∑
m=1
pbmz
b
m = −
M∑
m=1
phmz
h
m + δ(
M∑
m=1
pamz
a
m +
M∑
m=1
pcmz
c
m
M∑
m=1
pgmz
g
m)
2
M∑
m=1
phmz
h
m
(23)
M∑
m=1
pmk = 1 where k = a, b, c, g, h (24)
J∑
j=1
wJn = 1 where n = ε1, ε2 (25)
20
Here, the objective function is the Shannon entropy (1948) of the distribu-
tion of probabilities. Equations (20), (21) together with the reparameterized
steady–state conditions of the control problem (22) and (23) represent consis-
tency relations. Equations (24) and (25) are additivity or normalization con-
straints.
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